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Abstract
This paper investigates the determinants of involuntary insolvency and acquisition in
UK small and medium-sized companies. Using a competing risks model and data from
the survey database of the ESRC CBR at the University of Cambridge, we draw specic
attention to the impact of managerial characteristics. The explanatory power of nancial
variables, rm size, and rm age, highlighted by previous studies, is conrmed. In addi-
tion, the results indicate that rms run by entrepreneurial managers with higher human
capital and intentions to pursue a strategy of growth have greater survival prospects and
are less likely to be forced into insolvency or become acquired.
JEL Classication: C41, C11, C33, C51, L26, D21
KeyWords: Small rm, management human capital, involuntary insolvency, acquisition
target, competing risks model, MCMC, Bayesian analysis
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1 Introduction
Insolvency and acquisition serve an important common purpose in the market selection
process by moving assets to their most productive uses. Through insolvency or acqui-
sition rms lose their identity and disappear, and as such both outcomes dene the
longevity of an independent company. In the case of smaller companies characterised
by the unication of ownership and control, the relationship between rm-level exit and
owner-managersentrepreneurial abilities is particularly important.
Although there is no denitive data on numbers of UK small company insolvencies,
estimates for 2006 suggest that of the 1.15 million companies from the private sector,
5834 (or 0.5 per cent) exited by compulsory liquidation (BERR (2007), IS (2007)). Hard
data on acquisitions of small businesses are even more di¢ cult to come by, but based on
a report from the EC, some 3 per cent of small and medium-sized enterprises in Member
States are projected to experience ownership transfers through acquisition between 2000
and 2010 (EC (2002), Allinson, Braidford, Houston, Robson, and Stone (2007)).
Given that managers di¤er in their ability to discern, create, and develop protable
opportunities, the quality of management is generally regarded key to small rm longevity.
A high quality manager is more likely to select and implement projects more ably, re-
sulting in better performance, viable growth opportunities, and a greater return from
keeping the rm. However, the higher the level of managerial human capital, the greater
the return to outside alternative occupations. Therefore, the option to sell looks appeal-
ing if an increase in the value of the managers outside options diminishes the relative
return from keeping the rm. In contrast, a low ability manager who fails to convert
good opportunities into markets, will face an erosion in his expected return from keeping
the business. In this instance, whether the owner-manager can realise the desire to exit
by selling control to a new owner hinges on the presence within the rm of a business
model and growth opportunities that make an attractive acquisition target.
By di¤erentiating between involuntary termination due to insolvency and voluntary
exit via an acquisition we are better placed to understand the relative importance of
managers characteristics and rm-level factors to rm performance and longevity. In the
case of acquisition the entrepreneur trades o¤ the expected returns from keeping the rm
against the benets arising from selling and pursuing an outside option. This suggests
that a priori the human capital of the operating manager has an indeterminate impact
on the probability of selling the rm. An empirical analysis of the impact of managerial
characteristics on acquisition is therefore essential to understanding the exit behaviour
of small rms.
In the case of involuntary insolvency we would expect to see an inverse relationship
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between the quality of managerial human capital and exit likelihood since nancial fail-
ure exposes managerial inadequacies in the rm. Whether a debt default triggers an
involuntary insolvency outcome depends on the extent of the debt holderswillingness to
support a failing rm, determined in part by the quality of the current management. A
better manager with a good project may be able to convey to the lenders the intrinsic
value of the distressed rm more credibly, and will increase his odds of extending debt
maturity and avoiding a collapse into insolvency.
While the role of managers in determining small rmslongevity has received consid-
erable attention,1 much of what has been written is concerned with businesses trading
as either sole proprietors or partnerships. The extent to which the available empirical
results generalise to incorporated small rms, and, in addition, whether the duration
determinants exhibit signicant di¤erences across common types of exit remains unclear.
The motivation for focussing the present paper on small companies with limited liability,
stems from the fact that rms organised as limited companies dominate economic activity
in terms of wealth and job creation and thus represent an important target of policies
aimed at promoting enterprise. However, there has been noticeably little research e¤ort
seeking to determine the relevance of owner-managers characteristics for the exit be-
haviour of small companies. An indication of how managerial characteristics predict the
two exit pathways is of interest not only to owner-managers of small rms, bankers and
practitioners involved in insolvencies and sales of companies, but also to policymakers.
This paper contributes to the literature by providing evidence on the impact of man-
agerial characteristics on involuntary insolvency and acquisition for UK small companies.
We consider a number of dimensions of managerial human capital, including age, edu-
cational background, tenure, previous unemployment, and managerial intentions about
future growth. To examine the impact of these characteristics conditional on the inu-
ence of rm-specic and contextual factors we use unique survey data on UK small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs),2 developed by the ESRC Centre for Business Research
at the University of Cambridge.
To motivate the key dimensions of our analysis, Section 2 provides a summary of
stylised facts for both insolvency and acquisition. Section 3 presents the econometric
method, and in Section 4 we describe the data and variables of the duration model.
Section 5 contains the main empirical results, and Section 6 concludes.
1See, for example, Bates (1990), Bates (2005), Holmes and Schmitz (1995), Gimeno, Folta, Cooper,
and Woo (1997), Taylor (1999), Cressy (2006).
2Denitions of smalland medium-sizedare often based on employment size tests and tend to di¤er
between jurisdictions. In this paper, we adopt the original size bands used in the ESRC CBR surveys.
4
2 Stylised Facts about Small Firm Exit
Small company exits occur in various ways. An entrepreneur, protected by limited liabil-
ity, is free to cease operation voluntarily and will close the company down if he expects
a loss of equity investment due to current underperformance and bleak prospects for
growth. His ability to decide whether to continue the company may be removed in a
forced insolvency, arising from a debt default and initiated by creditors. Insolvency typ-
ically entails liquidation, upon which the owner loses all of the initial equity investment
and the creditors may incur a loss.
In the acquisition outcome, an entrepreneur exits by selling control to an acquirer,
at a premium in relation to the liquidation value of the rm. The premium paid reects
the current expectations of the buyer about the intrinsic value of the purchased business.
This implies that companies that are sold are always of higher quality in comparison with
those that disband voluntarily or are forced to discontinue in the event of an involuntary
insolvency.
The existing theoretical literature on reasons for rm exit, including Jovanovic (1982),
Jovanovic and Braguinsky (2004), Holmes and Schmitz (1995), and Cressy (2006), is mo-
tivated by a specic exit type, such as market exit or acquisition, but o¤ers no encom-
passing framework. In addition the extant literature on managerial characteristics and
small rm exit has generally focussed on unincorporated businesses, with a subsequent
neglect of the role of managers human capital in explaining exit routes among the rms
that use the legal form of company with limited liability. In this respect our current
understanding of small rm survival is based largely on three sets of stylised facts: the
attributes of the rm, the characteristics of the owner-manager, and the conditions of the
business environment. Below we briey review each of these components.
2.1 Managerial Characteristics
In considering the role of managerial characteristics as a determinant of rm exit we base
our discussion on a gain-seeking individual who maximises the expected payo¤s to both
his nancial and human capital investments and has claims on residual prots.3 As both
a manager and owner of the rm, the entrepreneur makes decisions about closure or sale
by comparing the expected return to keeping the venture with the payo¤ from an outside
alternative. Entrepreneurs di¤er in their managerial abilities, treated as an acquirable
and return-yielding asset, which may be enhanced through investment in human capital.
Human capital is referred to as knowledge and skills obtained through formal education
3See, for example, Lucas (1978), Jovanovic (1982), Endres and Woods (2006).
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and accumulated through work experience (Becker (1964)). Accumulated human capital
is likely to be coincident with both higher current earnings and expected continuation
cash ows, which may correspond with longer business durations. However, a more skilled
owner-manager with a higher level of human capital is also more likely to expect a higher
relative potential payo¤ to an occupation outside the current rm.
Human capital is generally measured by a number of factors including entrepreneurs
age, education, general work experience, and tenure with the rm. The importance of
these characteristics to exit behaviour has been established in studies concerning small
business owners and self-employed, with inferences supporting a negative association be-
tween owners human capital on closure or bankruptcy (see, e.g., Bates (1990), Van Praag
(2003), Bosma, Van Praag, Thurik, and de Wit (2004), Colombo, Delmastro, and Grilli
(2004), Cressy (2006)). Since age correlates with accumulated human capital and is in-
dicative of skills and experience that make good managers,4 enterprises operated by older
individuals, will ceteris paribus, perform better and are therefore less likely to experience
distress and insolvency. Age also a¤ects the willingness of the owner-manager to sell
a successful rm. Assuming that the discount rate of future payo¤s increases with age
(Zucker (1967)), older owner-managers have less time to recoup the costs of switching
occupations suggesting a negative association between managers age and sales of rms.
On the other hand, an aging individual may have a higher value of leisure and a greater
incentive to exit into retirement by selling a successful business. These o¤setting e¤ects
suggest an a priori indeterminate relationship between managers age and sales of rms.
Empirical studies that explicitly di¤erentiate between generic and specic compo-
nents of managerial human capital (see, e.g., Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, and Woo (1997))
also support an indeterminate impact of human capital on decisions to close or sell. The
indeterminate impact of human capital is usually attributed to its generic component,
comprising of skills that are useful both within the current rm and in other potential oc-
cupations. In contrast, the xity of investments in rm-specic human capital, dened as
skills useful only in the context of the current business, is expected to motivate managers
to keep rms and is found negatively related to exit.
A number of studies have found that previous experience of personal unemployment
by owner-managers reduces the probability of a voluntary exit (e.g., Storey (1994), Gray
(1998), Van Praag (2003)). Taking prior unemployment as a proxy for the value of human
capital in alternative occupations, this evidence is consistent with the view that lack of
skills lowers the managers perceived returns to outside options and serves as a strong
incentive for continuing the rm. As an indicator of lower entrepreneurial ability, previ-
4Andren, Magnusson, and Sjolander (2003) conclude that managerial skills may be developed through
experience, as entrepreneurs adapt their plans iteratively in response to the changing environment.
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ous unemployment experience is associated with a higher risk of bankruptcy (e.g., Taylor
(1999)). In addition, research on banksinternal rating systems for assessing credit risk
for SMEs nds evidence that the use of such softinformation as management experi-
ence alongside nancial factors leads to a more accurate ex-ante prediction of default
events (e.g., Grunert, Norden, and Weber (2005)). Related, a number of stylised facts
point to complementarities between managershuman capital, innovation, and workforce
training. In human capital-intensive industries, the quality of a business project is de-
ned by the human capital of workers that develop it. Firms with managers that possess
relatively high human capital tend to undertake a greater degree of workforce training.
Consequently, such rms can better align resources and capabilities with the changing en-
vironment to turn innovation into business success (Jennings and Beaver (1997), Leiponen
(2005)).
2.2 Firm-level Attributes
Studies of inter-rm variation in the propensity to exit generally contend that one part of
the explanation for exit resides in the di¤erences in a number of rm attributes, including
their age, size, capacity for innovation, and cash generating ability.
Firm Age
Although based upon a related literature on rm dynamics where the primary focus
is upon market exit the learning-by-doing model makes no distinction between the man-
ager and the rm and yields the important result that rms exit rate is a function of
rm age (Jovanovic (1982), Sutton (1997)). Younger smaller rms learn about their true
production e¢ ciency through economic activity and are more likely to exit the industry,
given that they initially enter on a sub-optimal scale and face uncertainty over the prof-
itability of operating in the product market. The relationship between age and survival
may reverse itself in some older rms when they become reluctant to change and mis-
aligned with their environments (Barron, West, and Hannan (1994)). In a model of small
business closure and sale, age conveys to potential buyers the quality of a business, and
correlates positively with the probability that businesses are sold (Holmes and Schmitz
(1995)).
Firm Size
Empirical support for the role of rm size seems less conclusive (Audretsch, Santarelli,
and Vivarelli (1999), Holmes, Stone, and Braidford (2001)). Larger rms are more likely
to avoid exit given that size correlates with market position and facilitates diversication
(Geroski (1995)). In turn this will mean on average less volatility of operating income and
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less susceptibility of returns to adverse external shocks. The positive e¤ect of rm size
conicts with more recent evidence that technological advance encourages smaller, more
specialised rms, eliminating in many sectors (especially within the service sector) the
comparative advantage attributable to scale economies (Greenhalgh and Gregory (2001),
Carree, Van Stel, Thurik, andWennekers (2002)). In what concerns smaller privately held
companies, the size of a target rm does not help explain takeover likelihood (Camerlynck,
Ooghe, and De Langhe (2005)), so there remains considerable uncertainty concerning the
relevance of size to sales of smaller companies.
Innovation
Although a number of notable studies support the notion that rms that innovate
tend to grow faster, capture higher prot margins and are less likely to exit the industry
(Geroski and Machin (1992), Audretsch (1995)), not all studies of small and medium-
sized enterprises nd a signicant and positive link from innovation to protability and
growth (Cosh, Hughes, and Wood (1996), Freel and Robson (2004)).
Cash-Generating Ability
A necessary condition for insolvency is a debt default arising from insu¢ cient internal
cash ows combined with the inability of the rm to raise nance externally (Lambrecht
(2001)). Among small private rms, which face a relative lack of external nancing op-
tions simply because share and bond markets are never accessible, of prime importance
for survival is cash-generating ability. Furthermore, the unication of ownership and con-
trol coupled with owner-managersaversion to diluting control, renders external private
equity unattractive, while informational opaqueness and lack of collateral restrict small
rmscapacity to borrow long-term. This exacerbates nancing constraints and creates
a link to forced exit in situations of liquidity shortfall (Berger and Udell (1998), Wat-
son and Wilson (2002)). However, in so far as lenders are able to infer the longer-term
cash-generating ability of rms from characteristics of owner-managers, small rms with
greater managerial human capital are more likely to overcome borrowing constraints and
less likely to discontinue due to distress (Cressy (1996)).
The literature on mergers and acquisitions takes expected future performance and
current nancial position of target rms as the main determinants of takeovers (see,
e.g., Wheelock and Wilson (2000)). The central precept is that the transfer of control
following a takeover should enhance value to the acquirer. A rational acquirer will seek
to generate economic rent - additional value that the ine¢ cient manager of a target rm
cannot achieve on his own.
An imbalance between a target rms growth opportunities and the nancial and
managerial resources it needs, serves as a strong motive for prospective buyers (Palepu
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(1986)). In new and expanding industries, underperforming and nancially stressed rms
that have promising long-run projects tend to attract bids from buyers with large cash
holdings and borrowing capacity (Pastena and Ruland (1986), Cosh and Hughes (1998)).
It is also noted that among smaller privately-held companies, target rms are free of
distress, have more cash but grow slower than the acquirer group and industry average
(Camerlynck, Ooghe, and De Langhe (2005)). We may expect that growth-resource
imbalances force the owner-manager to sell to an interested buyer.
2.3 Environment: Industry, Location and Macroeconomy
Both insolvency risk and takeover likelihood are inuenced by industry-wide conditions.
Predictability of demand, level of competition, customer dependence, technology, and
sunk costs all a¤ect survival of rms (Mata and Portugal (1994), Holmes, Stone, and
Braidford (2001), Andrade and Sta¤ord (2004)).
Insolvency risk is amplied at times of economic shocks when adverse changes in
demand, interest rates, and exchange rates hit the protability and liquidity of a rm
and its ability to raise external nance (Young (1995), Bhattacharjee, Higson, Holly,
and Kattuman (2002), Bunn and Redwood (2003), Disney, Haskel, and Heden (2003)).
While company insolvencies are counter-cyclical, acquisitions are less likely in economic
recessions when many buyers are credit constrained and sellers tend to postpone sales
until markets become more liquid. Times of stronger economic growth may provide a
stronger incentive for takeovers (Shleifer and Vishny (1992), Sudarsanam (2003)).
A substantial part of variation in the incidence of rm exit may be attributed to spatial
factors (Reinolds, Miller, and Maki (1993), Anyadike-Danes, Hart, and OReilly (2005)).
Apart from di¤erences in population growth and costs of factors of production, geograph-
ical clustering produces agglomeration externalities,5 resulting in increased productivity
and performance of a rm (Hoogstra and Van Dijk (2004)).
3 Duration Model of Business Exit
To construct our model of business exit we rst introduce notation. Let ti = (t

i1; t

i2; :::; t

iH)
0
denote a H  1 vector of latent duration times for rm i for a set 
H of H mutually ex-
clusive exit states. The observational rule is given by
tir = min(t

i ; c); (1)
5These external economies include availability of skilled labour and infrastructure and also extend to
localised knowledge spillovers, innovative milieux, social structure, trust, and institutions.
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where tir denotes the exit time for rm i by exit state r, and c denotes a censoring point.
When a rm changes status from a trading company to one of H exit routes then til  tir
l 6= r 2 
H ; and exit times other than r are censored at the duration time of state r.
The scope of the present study is restricted to two types of exit: exit of a rm may occur
either from involuntary insolvency or from acquisition.
In a standard continuous time setting survival times are censored either at the be-
ginning or end of the observation window. However, in this study we face an additional
problem of interval censoring. Exit times and the characteristics of our sample of small
and medium-sized rms were recorded during three surveys, varying from two- to four-
year intervals. In this instance time to exit is not unique but grouped in that the analyst
only observes the time interval in which a given duration is terminated.
The discrete nature of the available survival data leads us to employ a model for
discrete times. By transforming an observed duration into K non-overlapping intervals,
survival to time aK is equivalent to surviving each of the intervals Ak = [ak 1; ak) for
k = 1; :::; K. In this context each rm is represented by a vector of binary responses
for the non-overlapping time intervals (see Shumway (1999)). Using this approach an
alternative way to analyse survival data is to dene a binary random variable according
to survival or exit within each Ak interval and then utilise techniques suitable for binary
data.
We now introduce the discrete time analogues of the key objects for duration analysis.
For Aj = (aj 1; aj] denoting interval Aj and sj = j(ajjxj) = Pr(T  aj 1jxj) denoting
the probability of surviving interval Aj 1, then with xj denoting a vector of covariates
for Aj, fj = Pr(T = ajjxj) = sj   sj+1 is the probability of exiting in Aj; Pr(T = ajjT 
aj 1;xj) = j = fj=sj is the conditional exit probability, conditioning upon surviving
Aj 1: The probability of exit in the jth interval, namely the probability of surviving the
rst j-1 intervals with exit in the jth; is then written as
Pr(ajjxj) = (ajjxj)
j 1Y
k=1
k(akjxj):
In the case of H = 2 competing risks the likelihood contribution is comprised of three
components dependent upon whether the rm went into insolvency, was acquired, or
neither. To quantify the likelihood contributions we introduce two censoring indicators
for each type of exit: indicator dIji (dAji) takes a value of 1 in interval j if exit of rm i is
caused by insolvency (acquisition); and equal to 0 if the observation is censored in terms
of acquisition (insolvency). A rm surviving at the end of the jth interval is censored
on both causes with zero values for the respective censoring indicators, and likelihood
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contribution sI(aji)sA(aji): The likelihood contribution of a rm insolvent at time tj is
given by fIi(tj)sAi(aj 1); the likelihood contribution of a rm acquired at time tj is given
by fAi(tj)sAi(aj 1):
The contribution to the likelihood of rm i assuming independent risks may be written
as
Li(jdIi;dAi;xi) =
Y
Rj
f[fI(tji)sA(aj 1;i)]dIji [fA(tji)sI(aj 1;i)]dAjigwji
fsI(aji)sA(aji)g1 wji (2)
=
Y
Rj
fI(tji)dIjiA A(tji)dAjigwjif(1  I(tji)dIji)(1  A(tji)dAji)g1 wji
where  = f; g denotes a vector of unknown parameters:  is a K  1 vector of slope
parameters and  is a S  1 vector of shape parameters. wji = dIji+ dAji = 0 denotes
censoring on both dimensions in the jth interval, and Rj denotes the risk set for interval
Aj
6. The likelihood function over all rms is then L =
Q
i2Rj
Li(jdIi;dAi;xi):
In the present study we use the Weibull density to represent the distribution of the
time to exit. For the Weibull distribution the hazard function, (t) = t 1!; is a special
case of the proportional hazards model: t 1i is the baseline hazard function, ! denotes
a term that may be parameterized as a function of covariates, and  denotes the shape
parameter. The survival and hazard function for the jth interval with competing risks
q = I;A are given by
sjq = exp( !tqj );
jq = fjq=sjq = (sjq   sj+1q)=sjq = 1  sj+1q=sjq
= 1  exp( t
q
j e
0xj)
exp( tqj 1e0xj 1)
= 1  exp( 0(xj   xj 1)qj );
where j = tj tj 1; and  q is the shape parameter for competing risk q: For xj containing
a constant we can also estimate interval (and competing risk) specic xed e¤ects.
The assumptions of independence across the risk set, 
H ; is analogous to the assump-
tion of i.i.d. errors across a set of H discrete choices. For example, the tractability of
the multinomial logit discrete choice model comes with the price that the odds-ratio for
any pair of alternatives is invariant to the attributes of any other alternatives in 
J . The
precise analog in the context of duration analysis is that the time to exit is independent
6The risk set Rj comprises rms that are not already dead or censored at the beginning of the j-th
interval.
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of removing an element in 
H . In the context of this particular study the question of
interest is whether business longevity and exit via one route, for example insolvency, is
conditionally independent of the alternative exit route acquisition. Modelling the likeli-
hood of insolvency and acquisition as conditionally independent risks may be partially
justied given that we have access to an extensive set of manager characteristics and
rm-level attributes. However, to account for unobserved factors which a¤ect both the
likelihood of exit into insolvency or acquisition we use an error components approach.
Denoting the vector of error components by  we utilise a bivariate normal distribution
  BV N(0;) to represent these unobserved factors.7
3.1 Bayesian Estimation
In this study we adopt a Bayesian approach to modelling business exit. In the context
of business exit modelling there are a number of reasons for going beyond the connes of
the classical frequentist approach in providing statistical inference. First, estimation of
survival models when confronted with both complex censoring schemes and data struc-
tures can be di¢ cult to carry out. Of central importance is the form of the observational
rule, mapping a vector of latent durations, say t; and censoring scalars to an observed,
state specic exit time. With the exception of the exit state duration, say tr, all other
elements of t can be considered as missing data.
Following the seminal work of Gelfand and Smith (1990), the application of Bayesian
inference to models of survival has grown considerably. Campolieti (2001) notes that in
a non-Bayesian framework there are a number of problems for making valid and reliable
inference. As soon as one departs from the standard survival model with right censoring,
incorporating more complex observational rules involving interval censoring and/or trun-
cation, the complexities can create serious problems for classical analysis. For example,
independent of sample size considerations, the calculation of variance estimates in the
face of complex censoring and missing data mechanisms require asymptotic arguments
which may not be possible for some models. In contrast within a MCMC framework,
variance estimates and other posterior summaries are a simple by-product of the Gibbs
sampler. The distinguishing feature of the Bayesian approach to survival analysis is the
use of a data augmentation procedure in the treatment of censoring (See Kuo and Smith
(1992)). One of the important consequences is that we are able to explicitly account for
parameter uncertainty conditional upon the observed data.8
7By introducing dependence in this way we do not impose any restrictions on whether duration
dependence is increasing or decreasing. We note that this approach is exactly analogous to that used in
the mixed logit extension of the multinomial logit model.
8Ibrahim, Chen, and Sinha (2001) note that in the context of MCMC techniques, the computational
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Combining the likelihood function in (2) with the prior distributions on the vector of
slope parameters  and the vector of shape parameters  , we obtain the joint posterior
distribution for the hazard model, which we write as
p(;  jDi) _
Y
i
Li(;  jDi)p(j0;0)p( j 0) (3)
where Di = (dIi;dAi;xi); p(j0;0) and p( j 0) are, respectively, observed data and
the prior distributions for mean and shape parameters. Unless we assume  is known,
no conjugate prior is available. However, if we partition  into blocks, under certain
conditions Gibbs sampling may be performed using adaptive rejective sampling (ARS).9
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For slope parameters we employ noninformative independent normal priors of the
form   N(0;0), where 0 is diagonal, with each element set to 0.000001. The
shape parameters,  , capturing the time evolution of the hazard, are given independent
exponential prior distributions.
The algorithm we use is summarised as follows:11
1. Choose initial values for  and  .
2. For k = 1; :::; K draw a value from the conditional posterior density
p(kj k;  ;D)
where  k = fp : p 6= k; p = 1; :::; Kg
3. For s = 1; :::; S draw a value from the conditional posterior density
p( sj s;;D)
where  s = f l; l 6= s; l = 1; :::; Sg:
4. Repeat steps 2 and 3 for a large number of iterations. After discarding an initial
burn-in period, we calculate summary measures of the posterior for  and  :
aspects of incorporating missing data are manifest in one extra layer in the Gibbs sampler. This is in
stark contrast to the frequentist paradigm where algorithms for handling missing data are much more
computationally intensive.
9See Gilks and Wild (1992) and Dellaportas and Smith (1993).
10The full conditional posterior density is the distribution of each component of  conditional on all
other components of  and the data.
11Given log-concavity Gibbs sampling is performed using the BUGS software (Lunn, Thomas, Best,
and Spiegelhalter (2000)) which implements the derivative-free version of ARS.
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To deal with non-log concave densities a single Metropolis-Hastings (MH) algorithm
step is appended to the Gibbs Sampler. This amounts to adapting the proposal density of
the MH algorithm to the shape of the full conditional density (see George and McCulloch
(1995)).
4 Data and Variables
4.1 Sample Composition
We use a survey database on UK small and medium-sized enterprises, developed by the
ESRC Centre for Business Research based at the University of Cambridge. A panel of
over a thousand rms, drawn from the Dun and Bradstreets list of companies operating
in manufacturing and business services, has been surveyed comprehensively on three oc-
casions, in 1991, 1995 and 1997.12 The panel is unique in that it combines information
on managerial characteristics such as educational background, age, tenure, previous un-
employment, growth intentions, and use of external business advice, with information on
rm-level and industry-level attributes. This includes business performance, ownership
structure, innovation, workforce training, and the competitive environment.
Firm exit is documented on an annual basis from 1991 through to the end of 2000,
using information on changes in company status due to ownership transfers through
involuntary insolvencies13 and takeovers. In each time interval the rm can either continue
as an independent business, be placed into involuntary insolvency, or sold to an acquirer.
Table 1 gives a summary of the sample inclusion criteria. To be included in the survival
data set, rms must have been independent and trading companies with limited liability,
established prior to 1991 and employing less than 500 persons in 1991.14 The selection
rules yielded a survival data sample of 851 rms, of which 495 belong to manufacturing,15
and the remaining 356 come from knowledge-intensive business services,16 the sector that
is considered a dominant component of structural change and a key driver of growth in
the UK economy during the 1990s (Greenhalgh and Gregory (2001)).
12See SBRC (1992) and CBR (1998) for a detailed description of the ESRC CBR survey studies and
for a discussion of the representativeness of their database.
13We consider involuntary insolvencies, namely receiverships and compulsory liquidations.
14A state-based sampling scheme is used: all companies on the CBR database, that were either ac-
quired or placed into involuntary insolvency, and met criteria of data completeness and consistency, were
included in our survival data set. See, e.g., Manski and McFadden (1981) for a discussion.
15Manufacturing examples include mechanical engineering, chemicals, food processing, textiles, cloth-
ing, footwear, timber and furniture, and paper and pulp.
16Business services in our sample represent both traditional professional and new technology-based
services, and include management consultancy, marketing consultancy, advertising, computer services,
technical and professional consultancy, and design.
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Tables 2A and 2B illustrate exit times of the sample rms for manufacturing and
business services, respectively. Times to exit are grouped into three intervals: 1991-94,
1995-96, and 1997-2000. An individual rm rst comes under observation in 1991 and
by the end of each interval the rm either exits or its duration is censored.17 Table 2A
presents the survival experience of 495 manufacturing rms, of which 411 rms survived
to the beginning of the second interval, 47 exit by insolvency over the rst interval, and
further 37 become acquired between 1991 and 1994. We observe considerable variation in
time to exit in our sample, although the overall exit rates for the two sectors are similar.
Over the observation period 1991-2000, 37 per cent of manufacturing rms and 43 per
cent of business services rms discontinue as independent entities due to involuntary
insolvency and acquisition.
4.2 Delayed Entry and Left Truncation
In this study the observation window and the lifetime of the rm are not coincident. If
the rst point of observation corresponded to the rst point of risk, as would be the case
if all rms were new rms, then standard survival models with right censoring may be
applied. However, in this study we randomly sample from a population of small and
medium-sized rms of di¤erent ages at the beginning of the observation window.
In this study rms of di¤ering ages, which meet the inclusion criteria set out in Table
1, enter our study at the date of the rst survey, and are followed until the end of the
observation window or exit into either acquisition or insolvency. This is the problem of
left truncation or delayed entry, which adds a complication to the standard observational
rule. To see this let  denote the date of the rst survey and ai the starting date of
the rm. Note that the event  truncates the distribution of rm lifetimes in the sense
that we do not observe duration times for rms not alive at this point. Given that our
primary inclusion criteria is the sampling of rms which were trading at the point of the
rst survey - we need to revise the standard observational rule Ti = min(T i ; ci) with
Ti = min((T

i  1(ai + T i  ); ci): (4)
For rms whose lifetimes end prior to  we will have no information. In a non-parametric
setting it is relatively simple to adjust the Kaplan-Meier (product limit) estimator. In
parametric studies we face a number of options. Analogous to the non-parametric case,
it is possible to adjust the risk set by constructing age (or cohort) specic hazards. For
17For rms that have censored lifetimes at the end of an interval, the observed times are less than
true durations. In other words, duration (lifetime) is observed only when the event of insolvency or
acquisition occurs.
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example, Satchell and Shin (1996) in an analysis of mortgage arrears and repossession,
estimate a number of hazard functions based upon a classication of when the mortgage
was arranged, thereby recognising that mortgages with di¤erent years of origin have qual-
itatively di¤erent risk characteristics. A variant of this approach, which is implemented
in this study, is to include age of rm at rst observation as a control variate. This
obviously allows for a mean shift in the hazard but forces the e¤ect of covariates to be
equal across cohorts.18
4.3 Measurements and Prior Beliefs
In this section we partition the determinants of rm longevity into three groups: i) man-
agerial characteristics; ii) rm-level attributes, and iii) external variables controlling for
the inuence of market and location. Table 3 presents denitions of these determinants,
and transformations of their original values. Descriptive statistics for the sample of rms
at start of the observation (the 1991 initial survey) are reported in Table 4.19
The relevance of managerial ability to rm exit is examined by separating out the
e¤ects of generic and specic components of managers human capital. We use managers
calendar age and education to quantify generic skills, and managers years with the rm,
to measure rm-specic skills. Since managers age represents a proxy for generic skills
obtained through formal education and overall work experience, then ceteris paribus,
rms run by older and more experienced managers are more likely to perform better
and face a smaller risk of insolvency. However, the relationship between managers age
and the likelihood of acquisition is likely to be indeterminate. This follows since the
entrepreneurs decision whether to accept a takeover o¤er is determined in part, by the
incremental returns to retaining the rm against the option to sell: the quality of generic
human capital a¤ects both the expected returns to keeping the rm and the rewards to
the outside alternative. The intuition behind this prior is that an increase in managerial
skills enables the manager to take the intrinsic quality of a rm to a higher level, thereby
raising the expected return but also increasing the expected returns to outside options.
In forming our prior beliefs over the e¤ects of age on exit behaviour we also consider
the role of switching costs. As managers age, they will have less time to recoup costs of
re-training or losses of non-pecuniary benets to owning the rm.20 This generates higher
discounts to future payo¤s, discouraging movement to alternative occupations. Since the
costs of switching are likely to act as a disincentive to sell, we would expect to nd a
negative link from managers age to acquisition.
18See the discussion in Cnaan and Ryan (1989) for a comparison of di¤erent methods.
19Descriptive statistics for 1995 and 1997 are not reported here, but are available on request.
20Such as a exible and informal working environment, and lifestyle.
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We add a quadratic term to the model specication to test for the presence and
direction of the curvature in the relationship between exit likelihood and managers age.
A nonlinear prole is consistent with the learning model,21 where a rms growth and
survival are determined by the ability of its manager to create and maintain a unique
competitive position; and managers do not know their true managerial abilities ex-ante
and revealing them through operating rms. The age-risk prole for the insolvency exit
can be concave and sloping upwards during the initial phase of learning about managerial
ability and then sloping downwards.
To examine the inuence on exit of rm-specic human capital we include a tenure
variable measured by the number of years the chief-executive spent with the rm. In-
vestment in rm-specic skills accrued during tenure as the manager are unlikely to be
rewarded in outside options, and thereby create an incentive for the owner-manager to
retain the rm. We would expect to observe a negative association between tenure and
insolvency risk if investments in rm-specic human capital enhance managerial abilities
for judging risks and avoiding nancial distress.
Managerial education is measured using professional qualications awarded by pro-
fessional bodies. In the UK, professional qualications usually follow after an initial
degree and are associated with high levels both of general knowledge and of knowledge
that is valuable within a broader group of rms, such as the industrial or activity sector.
To the extent that our measure of managers education captures generic skills, the less
skilled would anticipate lower incremental returns to outside options and hence are likely
to favour keeping the rm over selling it. An owner-manager with lower education is
also more likely to mismanage their rm, resulting in an increased likelihood of nancial
distress and insolvency.
A noteworthy aspect of this study is that our empirical analysis explores whether vari-
ation in managerial intentions about rmsfuture growth a¤ects exit likelihood. Future
growth objectives are measured by a four-level categorical variable, recording the extent
to which managers believe their rms will grow. Assuming that managers are rational,
growth objectives represent a forward-looking proxy for the quality of a business. Studies
that focus on the importance of the personality of the entrepreneur (see, e.g., Gatewood,
Shaver, Powers, and Gartner (2002)) argue that expectations of business performance
derive from entrepreneursperceptions about the level of their own human capital. In
particular, they nd that entrepreneurs who expect to perform well do. We believe that
our measure of expected growth captures a component of the managers assessment of his
worth to the rm. In this sense, behind a proactive business strategy of greater growth
lies managerial condence in their own ability to deliver a higher level of performance and
21See Jovanovic (1982).
17
a greater potential for survival. Therefore higher growth expectancies might be associated
with a reduced risk of insolvency, consistent with the argument that good performance
brings down the risk of distress but heightens the likelihood of a sale of a rm.
To examine the proposition that previous unemployment creates an incentive for the
owner-manager to keep the rm, we use a binary variable indicating if the rm was started
as a result of the actual or potential unemployment of the founder. We also include, as a
control variable, managers ownership stake. Concentration of ownership and control in
the hands of the entrepreneur is measured by three levels of equity stake held by the chief
executive. Table 4 reveals a high level of equity ownership concentration in the sample
rms, with the median values at the legal control threshold, giving the manager ultimate
power over the rm.
A number of studies (see, e.g., Storey (1994), Barclays (2001)) have indicated that
small rm public policy initiatives, introduced in the 1990s, had an impact on both access
to nance and growth of UK small businesses. We control for advice on management and
strategy by using a dummy according to whether rms report they have approached
government agencies that dispense business advice assistance.22
To help disentangle the impact of managerial characteristics from rm-level hetero-
geneity we include in model specications rm-level attributes, such as innovative ability,
workforce training, export orientation, past growth,23 protability, need for external -
nance, rm size, rm age at entry to the study, and being a start-up (Tables 3 and 4).
The dummy for competitive advantage and growth opportunities embedded in innovation,
is created using information on process and product innovations. Di¤erences in human
capital of employees are considered important for the transformation of innovations into
prots and, by implication, to exit. We use a dummy for the presence of workforce train-
ing to indicate the quality of workers. We expect a positive impact of innovation and
workforce training on takeover likelihood and a negative impact on the risk of involuntary
insolvency. To di¤erentiate between the rms that operate solely in domestic markets
from those that export, we use a dummy variable equal to one for non-exporting rms.24
Our primary measure of the nancial performance of a commercial enterprise is prot
margin before interest, directors emoluments and tax. Prot margin is a traditional
indicator of the cash generating ability of a rm. Financial pressure arising from lack of
funds is captured by a binary measure of demand for external nance, set to one for rms
22This information is available only for 1991, at entry to the study.
23To ensure separation between the e¤ect of expected growth and the impact of actual (realised)
growth, we add to the set of independent variables the logarithmic di¤erence in annual sales revenues.
24Exporting may be seen as an important dimension of business strategy, reecting potential for
stronger performance. It may also point to a higher operational risk arising from intense competition
and a greater exposure to exchange rate risk.
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that have attempted to raise funds externally. Since protability determines liquidity, we
might expect an inverse relationship between protability and insolvency risk. The e¤ect
of an increase in demand for external nance on the risk of forced insolvency is likely to
be positive due to the fact that for small rms loan nance represents a major source of
external funds.
Firm size is measured using four employment bands, the smallest referring to micro
rms employing 2-9 persons and the largest including rms with more than 50 persons.25
To account for left truncation we include the age of the rm in 1991 (at entry to the
study), represented by ve age cohorts. The rst cohort comprises rms who have been
in business for ve years or less, whereas the fth category includes rms who have been
trading for more than 50 years. Since earlier studies nd that newer younger rms have
lower survival prospects compared with established enterprises, especially in industries
characterised by substantial economies of scale, we also include a binary variable for rms
that were launched as new start-ups.
We also control for a number of contextual factors. The inuence of market structure
is proxied by competition and customer dependence. Intensity of competition is measured
by a categorical variable, taking the value of one when rms have two or fewer serious
competitors, and four in rms competing with more than ten rivals. Customer dependence
refers to the percentage of sales accounted for by the largest customer and is also measured
on a categorical scale. Low dependence rms comprise category one, where the largest
customer accounts for less than 10 per cent of sales, and group fourdenotes dependence
levels of 50 per cent and more. Since industry sector may represent a signicant source of
exit heterogeneity in our sample of small rms, we segment the data and estimate models
for manufacturing and business services separately.26 The nal control variable allows for
the di¤erential impact of location and is based on four regional groupings summarised in
Table 5.
Since the analysis period spans the UK recession of the early 1990s and the period of
subsequent recovery and growth, di¤erences in macroeconomic conditions are accommo-
dated by including time interval-specic xed e¤ects.
25The classication of the employment variable used in this study to proxy rm size (Table 3) reects
the thresholds recommended by the European Commission. Employment thresholds dening small and
medium-sized enterprise(SME) di¤er across countries and jurisdictions. The ongoing debate on simpler
accounting standards for SMEs points to the di¢ culty in setting, and working with, universal thresholds,
with some commentators supporting the removal of the employment size criterion in favour of the broader
term non-publicly accountable entity(IASB (2007)).
26Although we utilise a relatively coarse industrial classication, this helps ameliorate the sparse data
problem arising from the use of more disaggregate industry groups.
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5 Results
In presenting our results we di¤erentiate between the e¤ects of managerial characteristics,
rm-level attributes, and the environment.27 These are reported in Tables 7A-B, 8A-B
and 9A-B, respectively, with subsections A referring to the results for manufacturing, and
subsections B to the results for business services. Table 6 summarises the overall pattern
of the associations, while Tables 10A and 10B present additional model parameters.
5.1 Managerial Characteristics
In interpreting our ndings we return to the idea that a sale of a rm to a new owner
is driven, in part, by the current owners preferences regarding occupational choices.
In contrast, an involuntary insolvency indicates creditorslow condence in the current
managers ability to overcome the illiquidity of the rm, resulting in the creditorsdecision
to make the owner-manager leave the rm.
Results on the impact of managerial characteristics are presented in Tables 7A and
7B. Measuring the generic component of human capital by the log age of the chief exec-
utive, our ndings suggest that generic skills are an important determinant of small rm
longevity for both exit types in business services and are also linked to the likelihood
of forced insolvency in manufacturing. The observed impact of managers age on exit is
summarised as follows:
Insolvency Acquisition
Age Age2 Prole Age Age2 Prole
Manufacturing   + Convex ? ? ?
Business Services +   Concave   + Convex
The question mark symbol (?) indicates where there is no signicant e¤ect.
The results for manufacturing rms accord with the predictions of the human capital
model (Becker (1964)), in that insolvency risk is a convex function of age. As managers
27We attempted to estimate a dependent competing risks model using correlated random-e¤ects but
experienced a number of numerical problems with the Gibbs and Metropolis-Hastings sampling. All
results are based on conditionally independent competing risks. To ensure exogeneity, the time-varying
explanatory variables are measured at the start of each interval.
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age and accumulate experience, they develop skills that assist in ameliorating the risk
of nancial distress and failure. A positive quadratic term suggests that willingness to
invest in updating risk management skills declines with age, as the present value of future
returns to investment in human capital diminishes. In contrast, for business services rms
the impact of managers age on insolvency exhibits a concave prole, consistent with
Jovanovics learning model (Jovanovic (1982)). The probability of involuntary insolvency
initially increases with age as younger and less experienced owner-managers learn about
their ability to run rms. After initial learning, managers accumulate skills that translate
into more competent management of risks, so that among the rms run by the older
owner-managers the risk of insolvency falls.
The results for acquisition exit in business services rms also accord with the human
capital model. The managers age prole of the acquisition likelihood is convex and is
consistent with the notion that older owner-managers with accumulated transferable skills
might expect higher relative returns to outside options. We nd no evidence to conrm
the link from age of manager to takeover likelihood for manufacturing rms: the linear
and quadratic terms are insignicant, even if plausibly signed.
We suspect that the di¤erences between business services and manufacturing in the
managers age-insolvency prole reect, in part, the distinguishing features of the two
sectors. The concave prole with the highest insolvency risk experienced by middle-aged
managers is consistent with a sector with relatively low asset tangibility, such as high-
skill intensive business-related services. The commercial worth of a rm in advanced
business services will largely be determined by its intangible assets, of which managers
skills comprise a dominant proportion. However, low tangibility of assets constrains the
rms ability to rollover debt. As a consequence, in situations where much of managerial
human capital is experiential and acquired via learning-by-doing, creditors may experience
di¢ culty in placing a value on the intangible assets of a rm operated by a younger
manager. As learning progresses, the manager simultaneously accrues skills and rms
assets. In the older age group, once managers have completed the learning, the value of
intangibles may become easier to ascertain, making it easier for rms to rollover debt in
the event of nancial di¢ culty, decreasing insolvency risk.
We measure the rm-specic component of human capital by the tenure of the chief
executive. Our estimates for manufacturing rms conrm the notion that higher levels
of rm-specic human capital, as identied by longer tenures, enhances the ability of
an owner-manager to avoid the risk of debt default and insolvency, and may also create
expectations of higher incremental returns to keeping their rm (Table 7A). The link from
educational attainments to exit appears strong only for acquisitions in manufacturing
(Table 7A). Firms run by managers with less professional qualications are associated
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with a lower probability of acquisition suggesting lower relative returns to outside options.
In interpreting the observed association between the managers perceptions of future
growth and exit risk, we note that perceived future growth is likely to reect the quality
of both the manager and the business. This follows since rational entrepreneurs will
expect growth only if they are condent in their abilities to succeed.28 In this respect,
higher levels of human capital would be implicit in higher growth objectives. In addition,
expected growth, as articulated by the owner-manager, can be seen as an indicator of
the quality of a rms investment projects. If having high value investment opportunities
facilitates access to nance, then higher expected growth will be associated with a lower
risk of distress and insolvency. This prior reasoning receives support from our empirical
analysis. Irrespective of the sector in which the rm operates, an increase in expected
growth lessens the risk of involuntary exit by insolvency (Tables 7A and 7B).
The negative e¤ect of growth perceptions on acquisition for manufacturing rms sug-
gests that an expected increase in growth raises future anticipated payo¤s to owner-
managers from remaining in business, relative to the alternative of the immediate payo¤
from selling rms. This stands in sharp contrast to the results for business services,
where we observe a signicant positive impact of expected growth on the probability of
acquisition (Table 7B). This nding suggests that an expected increase in future income
does not outweigh the returns to the owner-manager from switching out of business into
an alternative occupation. If we assume that buyers correctly infer the values of acquired
rms, the positive e¤ect of expected growth implies that rms that intend to grow are of
higher quality. In this instance the positive sign for business services suggests the pres-
ence of an imbalance between the quality of managerial human capital and the quality of
the rm, to which the current manager responds by selling the rm.
We nd that previous experience of unemployment is an important determinant of
exit in manufacturing rms (Table 7A). Previous unemployment of the owner-manager is
indicative of inadequate levels of human capital and may result in relatively lower returns
to outside options, acting as a disincentive to sell their rm. For forced insolvency, the
90% credible interval suggests that unemployment experience is negatively associated
with exit. This result highlights the learning aspect of unemployment in the sense that
the need to overcome the e¤ects of being unemployed might have spurred accumulation of
tacit generic knowledge, which later translated into better management and a sustainable
business.
The e¤ects of ownership di¤ers across exit routes. For acquisition exit, the concentra-
tion of ownership and control in the hands of the chief executive decreases the probability
of selling a business services rm. This nding implies that the amount of nancial cap-
28See, e.g., Gatewood, Shaver, Powers, and Gartner (2002).
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ital committed to an enterprise by the manager serves as a barrier to voluntary exit
(Table 7B). The signicant positive coe¢ cients on managers ownership for involuntary
insolvency of manufacturing rms (Table 7A) reects that more concentrated ownership
may be associated with a greater risk of default.
Our results suggest that managers who had sought business advice from government
assistance agencies were no less likely to exit - by insolvency or by takeover - than those
with no agency contacts. However, this nding should be treated with caution since it
relies on a single measurement of the agency contact variable.
5.2 Firm-level Attributes and the Environment
5.2.1 Firm-level Attributes
We observe a number of signicant e¤ects of rm-specic attributes (Tables 8A and
8B). Our results conrm the standard proposition that insolvency risk is decreasing in
protability. For both manufacturing and business services, impending insolvency is
visible in deteriorating prot margins. The nding that current protability does not
a¤ect the likelihood of acquisition is consistent with the rm valuation models, which base
valuation on the discounted value of future prots. As shown in Tables 8A and 8B, there
is no clear-cut evidence that acquisitions of rms with low protability are more likely.
In neither sector is protability found to signicantly a¤ect the likelihood of acquisition,
the only exception being a statistically signicant negative impact of protability among
the business services rms belonging to the second from bottom quintile, relative to the
reference group of the least protable rms.
We observe a positive relationship between the demand for external funds and insol-
vency risk. This nding indicates that distressed rms are more likely to seek nance
to overcome liquidity shortfalls, although this e¤ect is signicant only for manufacturing
rms (Table 8A). One explanation for the observed di¤erences between the two sectors
in the importance of the link from demand for nance to insolvency risk may relate to
di¤erences in the ability to provide collateral against a loan. Whereas rms in the manu-
facturing sector have higher levels of tangible assets available as collateral, in knowledge
and expertise based rms from business services tangible assets are relatively low, which
might prevent these rms from placing requests for loans.
This explanation is also consistent with our nding that the demand for external
nance is associated with a higher likelihood of acquisition in business services (Table
8B). In a saleable rm, perceived as viable by a prospective acquirer, a gap between the
nancial resources that are needed for the rm and the funds available to it, may increase
the owner-managers motivation to take an acquisition deal and sell the business.
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Our results highlight the important role of exports in small rm duration. However,
the direction of the impact tends to di¤er between exit destinations and across sectors.
For the manufacturing rms, we nd that diversication, a¤orded by exporting, reduces
the vulnerability of a rm to insolvency (Table 8A). Conversely, exports enhance the
pre-acquisition prole of a target rm in business services (Table 8B). The likelihood of
acquisition exit for the average manufacturing rm is negatively a¤ected by past growth in
sales revenues, perhaps through lowering the current owner-managers expected relative
returns to outside options which suppresses their willingness to sell.
Workforce training signicantly relates to rm duration only for acquisition and only
among manufacturing rms (Table 8A). The signicant positive e¤ect clearly implies that
companies that provide training for their workers are more likely to become an acquisition
target. In the case of a technologically intensive sector, such as manufacturing, a high
level of workforce skills is crucial to the quality of a rms investment projects and, by
implication, will bear on the perceived value of the rm. Given that training enhances
the ability of workforce, this nding is in keeping with the notion that takeovers transfer
higher quality rms.
Our analysis also suggests that it is useful to distinguish between manufacturing and
business services when measuring the impact of innovation on rm exit. A signicant
negative association between innovation and exit is a feature of rms in business services
(Table 8B), implying that being an innovator could lower the risk of going under or
selling up. Although innovation appears vital to survival of independent companies in
an industry with a high rate of growth, such as the UK business services sector during
the analysis period,29 this variable lacks the power to distinguish reliably insolvency from
acquisition.
Firm size proxied by employment does not appear to a¤ect signicantly business
longevity in manufacturing, except for the rms belonging to the size group 10-24 em-
ployees, where insolvency risk is lower, compared with the reference group of micro rms
with 1-9 employees (Table 8A). In contrast, for business services rms, the link from
employment size to exit likelihood seems stronger: the risk of involuntary insolvency
increases in rm size, and being a larger rm can also raise the probability of being
taken-over (Table 8B).
The inclusion of rm age at entry to the study as a variate provides a way of handling
left-truncation. In manufacturing, the likelihood of both acquisition and insolvency is
higher in younger cohorts (Table 10A), and is consistent with rms learning over time.
Older cohorts may have a greater knowledge of the environment and are therefore better
equipped for absorbing external shocks. Additionally, more mature businesses may have
29See, e.g., Greenhalgh and Gregory (2001), SBS (2003).
24
fewer growth opportunities which may lower their attractiveness as takeover targets. In
business services, the e¤ects on exit of rm age at entry are discernible only for acquisition
and also suggest younger rms have higher chances of being sold in comparison with the
older than fty years cohort (Table 10B). For both sectors, the 95% credible intervals for
the estimates of shape parameters lie well above unity, which means that the likelihoods
of both exits are increasing with time (Tables 10A and 10B).
Neither pathway for exit appears associated with being a start-up rm and, therefore,
we cannot lend credence to the view that de novo rms are more prone to exit than
others.
5.2.2 Environment: Industry, Location and the Macroeconomy
Our analysis supports the view that environmental factors contribute to exit risk. Higher
customer dependence increases insolvency risk but reduces takeover likelihood in business
services (Table 9B). Firms in the business services sector with three to ten competitors
have a lower insolvency risk, relative to rms with two or fewer competitors (Table 9B).
The e¤ect of market structure on the exit behaviour of manufacturing rms is less conclu-
sive. Only for the markets with three to ve serious competitors is the e¤ect on insolvency
risk of seller concentration noticeable and suggests a positive impact of increased compe-
tition on asset reallocation through involuntary insolvency (Table 9A).
Di¤erences in location have signicant e¤ects only for the rms in the business services
sector. Compared to the reference group of small rms based in South East England,
being located in Outer Southern England30 reduces the probability of a sale of the rm
(Table 9B).
The results for the interval-specic intercepts, reecting shifts in exit risk due to
factors common to all rms are quite similar across exit types and between sectors. Exit
risk decreased once the economy had moved out of the recession of the early 1990s into
a period of growth (Tables 10A and 10B). The expected signs of the posterior means of
the interval-specic xed e¤ects together with the associated credible intervals are highly
suggestive of the strong e¤ect that changes in the macroeconomic environment could
exert on rm survival. For insolvency, the results conrm the prior belief that insolvency
risk is counter-cyclical. For acquisition, the pattern of the results for the interval-specic
xed e¤ects implies that the adverse conditions of an economic downturn can inuence
the decision to sell.
30In East Anglia, South West, and the East Midlands.
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6 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the role of managerial characteristics in determining invol-
untary insolvency and acquisition in UK small and medium-sized companies operating
in manufacturing and business services. The owner-managers human capital was cast
in terms of rm-specic, profession-specic, and generic components, measured respec-
tively by tenure, education, and age. Additional heterogeneity was captured by previous
experience of unemployment, and intentions about future growth.
Our results reveal that after accounting for variation in a wide range of rm-specic
attributes and economic and regional conditions, managerial characteristics are impor-
tant determinants of small business longevity. We nd that the links from managers
human capital to insolvency and acquisition vary by industry and exit, and specically
di¤erent types of managerial capital matter for di¤erent sectors. For example, in the
manufacturing sector there is value in the tenure of the chief executive, in that attach-
ment to a rm reduces the risk of insolvency. With respect to profession-specic human
capital, only in manufacturing do we nd that, after controlling for other dimensions of
managerial capital, there is a signicant e¤ect of professional qualications - lowering the
probability of acquisition.
We operationalise the notion of generic human capital using age as a proxy, and
we observe very di¤erent age-exit proles. In business services the likelihood of exiting
through acquisition is relatively higher for rms operated by older entrepreneurs. In
manufacturing rms the probability of ending up in involuntary insolvency is greater for
younger managers with shorter tenures, the age group often associated with less work
experience and lower levels of skills.
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Table 1: Sample Inclusion Criteria
Legal type: Company with limited liability
Firm size: Less than 500 employees at the beginning
of observation period, in 1991
Industry sector: Manufacturing or business services
Status at the beginning of observation period, in 1991: Independent and trading company
Status at the end of observation period, in 2000: One of the three mutually exclusive states:
(i) alive and independent;
(ii) gone into involuntary insolvency; and
(iii) acquired
Absence of unit non-response in follow-up surveys: Companies with unit non-response in
1995 and 1997 surveys are excluded
Firm start date: Established prior to 1991
Table 2A: Exit in the Sub-sample of 495 Manufacturing Firms
1: 1991-1994 R isk Set 1: 495 rm s
At the end Insolvent Acquired Censored
of the interval: 47 37 411
2: 1995-1996 R isk Set 2: 411 rm s
At the end of the interval: Inso lvent Acquired Censored
17 22 372
3: 1997-2000 R isk Set 3: 372 rm s
At the end of the interval: Inso lvent Acquired Censored
21 38 313
Table 2B: Exit in the Sub-sample of 356 Business Services Firms
1: 1991-1994 R isk Set 1: 356 rm s
At the end Insolvent Acquired Censored
of the interval: 45 24 287
2: 1995-1996 R isk Set 2: 287 rm s
At the end of the interval: Inso lvent Acquired Censored
17 28 242
3: 1997-2000 R isk Set 3: 242 rm s
At the end of the interval: Inso lvent Acquired Censored
12 28 202
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Table 3: Denitions of Covariates in Tables 6, 7A-B, 8A-B, 9A-B, and 10A-B
Managerial Characteristics:
Age of Manager Log number of age of Chief Executive (CE) and the square of the log
number of age of CE, in 1991 and 1997
Education Binary: 1=nil proportion of directors with
professional qualications in 1991 and 1997
Managers Tenure Log number of Chief Executives years with rm, in 1991 and 1997
Previous Unemployment Binary: 1=actual or potential unemployment of founder
Future Growth Objectives 3-level categorical:
1=become smaller or stay the same size; 2=grow moderately,
3=grow substantially, in 1991, 1995, and 1997
Managers Ownership 3-level categorical:
1 = CEs equity stake in rm is 10% and less; 2 = 11-50%;
3=51% and greater, in 1991
Use of Government Business Advice Binary: 1=sought advice, in 1991
Firm-level Attributes:
Innovation Binary: 1= innovation in products / processes,
in 1991, 1995, and 1997
Workforce Training Binary: 1= trainer, in 1991 and 1997
Non-exporter Binary: 1=nil export sales, in 1991, 1995 and 1997
Actual Growth in Sales Log di¤erence of sales for 1987-91,
1991-95, and 1995-97
Protability Categorical: prot margin quintiles, in 1991, 1995 and 1997
Attempts to Raise External Finance Binary: 1=sought external nance, in 1991, 1995, and 1997
Employment Size 4-level categorical: 1=2-10 persons; 2=10-24; 3=25-49;
4=50 and more, in 1991, 1995, and 1997
New Start-up Binary: 1= new start-up as opposed to a purchased business
Environment:
Seller Concentration 4-level categorical, according to the number of serious
competitors: 1=0-2; 2=3-5; 3=6-10;
4=11 and more, in 1991, 1995 and 1997
Customer Dependence 4-level categorical, based on the percentage of sales to largest
customer: 1= less than 10%, 2=10-24%; 3=25-49%;
4=50% and more, in 1991, 1995, and 1997
Location 4-level categorical: 1=South East England;
2=Outer Southern England;
3=Industrial Heartland;
4=Periphery: North, Wales, Scotland
Other:
Age of Firm at Entry to Study 5-level categorical, based on age in 1991:
1=over 50 years; 2=26-50; 3=11-25;
4=6-10 and 5= younger than 5

Note to Table 3: P rot margin is prot b efore interest, d irectors emolum ents and tax expressed as a prop ortion of sa les.
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics
Raw Data, 1991 Mean Median S.D. Obs.
Manufacturing Firms
Employment Size, total number of employees 66 35 81 495
Sales, £ m 3.79 1.50 7.59 479
Exports, £ m 0.73 4.50 3.43 486
Firm Age at Entry to Study, in 1991, years 30 17 34 495
Prot Margin 0.07 0.07 0.15 390
Proportion of Directors with Prof. Qualications 0.37 0.33 0.34 484
Chief Executives Equity Stake in the Firm 0.47 0.50 0.28 459
Age of Chief Executive, years 49 49 9 482
Chief Executives Years with the Firm 15.64 13.5 10.01 486
Previous Unemployment of Founder: binary, 1=Yes 0.29 0 0.45 444
Future Growth Objectives: 4-level categorical 3.07 3 0.62 490
Use of Government Business Advice: binary, 1=Yes 0.48 0 0.50 495
Innovation: binary, 1=Yes 0.82 1 0.39 466
Workforce Training: binary, 1=Yes 0.72 1 0.45 494
New Start-up: binary, 1=Yes 0.73 1 0.45 494
Attempts to Raise External Finance: binary, 1=Yes 0.65 1 0.48 481
Number of Serious Competitors 10 5 18 452
Customer Dependence 2.05 2 0.94 467
Business Services Firms
Employment Size, total number of employees 43 17 66 356
Sales, £ m 1.92 0.80 3.38 341
Exports, £ m 0.16 0 0.70 346
Firm Age at Entry to Study, in 1991, years 14 9 19 356
Prot Margin 0.09 0.07 0.15 294
Proportion of Directors with Prof. Qualications 0.48 0.50 0.40 344
Chief Executives Equity Stake in the Firm 0.52 0.50 0.30 333
Age of Chief Executive, years 47 45 9 349
Chief Executives Years with the Firm 10.51 9 7.38 352
Previous Unemployment of Founder: binary, 1=Yes 0.27 0 0.45 350
Future Growth Objectives (4-level categorical) 3.16 3 0.62 354
Innovation: binary, 1=Yes 0.79 1 0.41 309
Use of Government Business Advice: binary, 1=Yes 0.31 0 0.47 356
Training for Personnel: binary, 1=Yes 0.63 1 0.48 353
New Start-up: binary, 1=Yes 0.75 1 0.43 354
Attempts to Raise External Finance: binary, 1=Yes 0.62 1 0.49 345
Number of Serious Competitors 13 5 21 314
Customer Dependence 2.26 2 1 335

Notes to Table 4: Future grow th ob jectives is a 4-level categorica l variab le which equals to 1 for
stay the sam e size; 2 for grow smaller, and 3 and 4 for grow moderately and  grow substantia lly.
Custom er dep endence takes values from 1 to 4 accord ing to the p ercentage of sa les to the largest
custom er, w ith 1 for <10% and 4 for  50%. Prot margin is prot b efore interest,
d irectors emolum ents and tax, expressed as a prop ortion of sa les.
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Table 5: Sample Distribution by Region
Business
Manufacturing Services
Firms Firms
South East England 178 195
Outer Southern England:
East Anglia, South West, the East Midlands 104 56
Industrial Heartland:
West Midlands, North West, Yorkshire and Humberside 161 70
Periphery:
North, Wales, Scotland 52 35
Total: 495 356
Table 6: Relationships Present in 90% and 95% Credible Intervals
Manufacturing Business Services
Insolvency Acquisition Insolvency Acquisition
E¤ects of Managerial Characteristics:
Age of Manager
LogAge   +  
(LogAge)2 +   +
Education:
Nil proportion of directors with prof. qualifns.  
Managers Tenure
Log(Chief Executives Years with Firm)    
Previous Unemployment    
Future Growth Objectivesa
grow moderately     +
grow substantially       +
Managers Ownership:
Share of Equity held by Chief Executiveb
11-50 per cent +  
51 per cent and greater +  
Use of Government Business Advice
Signs ( + = ) represent positive and negative e¤ects and are shown only for the variables
signicant in inuencing exit. Results are based on a single chain run of iterations 15,001-23,000.
a Reference Group: become smaller or stay same size.
b Reference Group: 10 per cent and less.
(continued)
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Table 6: (continued)
Manufacturing Business Services
Insolvency Acquisition Insolvency Acquisition
E¤ects of Firm-level Attributes:
Innovation    
Workforce Training +
Non-exporter +  
Actual Growth in Sales  
Protabilityc
Quintile 2      
Quintile 3    
Quintile 4  
Quintile 5 (largest)    
Attempts to Raise External Finance + +
Employment Sized
10-24 employees  
25-49 employees + +
50+ + +
New Start-up
E¤ects of Environment:
Market Structure:
Seller Concentration, Number
of Serious Competitorse
3-5 +  
6-10  
more than 10
Customer Dependence:
Proportion of Sales to Largest Customerf
10-24 per cent +
25-49 per cent +
50 per cent or more  
Locationg
Outer Southern England  
Industrial Heartland
Periphery (North, Wales, Scotland)
Additional Parameters:
Age of Firm at Entry to Studyh
Age 26-50 +
Age 11-25 + + +
Age 6-10 + +
Age  5 + +
Signs ( + = ) represent positive and negative e¤ects and are shown only for the variables
signicant in inuencing exit. Results are based on a single chain run of iterations 15,001-23,000.
c Reference Group: quintile 1 (smallest).
d Reference Group: 2-9 employees.
e Reference Group: 0-2.
f Reference Group: less than 10 per cent.
g Reference Group: South East.
h Reference Group: 51+.
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Table 7A: E¤ects of Managerial Characteristics in Manufacturing Firms
Results are based on a single chain run of iterations 15,001-23,000
Posterior Posterior quantiles
Mean 2.5% 5% Median 95% 97.5%
Insolvency
Age of Manager
LogAge -7.204 -9.184 -9.065 -7.576 -4.642 -4.245
(LogAge)2 2.821 2.067 2.142 2.798 3.556 3.711
Education: Nil Proportion
of Directors with Professional Qualications -0.081 -0.703 -0.589 -0.080 0.419 0.507
Managers Tenure
Log(Chief Executives Years with Firm) -1.498 -2.362 -2.207 -1.516 -0.657 -0.470
Previous Unemployment -0.562 -1.205 -1.118 -0.549 -0.055 0.039
Future Growth Objectivesa
grow moderately -1.327 -2.137 -2.003 -1.310 -0.688 -0.562
grow substantially -2.292 -3.550 -3.318 -2.263 -1.296 -1.152
Managers Ownership: Share of Equity
held by Chief Executiveb
11-50 per cent 1.122 -0.022 0.125 1.067 2.393 3.253
51 per cent and greater 1.243 0.013 0.184 1.193 2.525 3.536
Use of Government Business Advice -0.167 -0.699 -0.608 -0.168 0.267 0.337
Acquisition
Age of Manager
LogAge -0.830 -3.090 -2.907 -0.939 1.702 1.932
(LogAge)2 0.724 -0.442 -0.319 0.747 1.523 1.664
Education: Nil Proportion
of Directors with Professional Qualications -0.769 -1.496 -1.371 -0.758 -0.194 -0.091
Managers Tenure
Log(Chief Executives Years with Firm) -1.042 -1.864 -1.748 -1.062 -0.308 -0.115
Previous Unemployment -1.038 -1.730 -1.630 -1.030 -0.488 -0.402
Future Growth Objectivesa
grow moderately -0.782 -1.579 -1.442 -0.804 -0.020 0.130
grow substantially -1.193 -2.189 -2.053 -1.207 -0.272 -0.076
Managers Ownership: Share of Equity
held by Chief Executiveb
11-50 per cent -0.064 -0.807 -0.666 -0.057 0.539 0.636
51 per cent and greater -0.191 -1.012 -0.874 -0.181 0.478 0.641
Use of Government Business Advice 0.208 -0.263 -0.207 0.214 0.599 0.687
a Reference Group: become smaller or stay same size.
b Reference Group: 10 per cent and less.
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Table 7B: E¤ects of Managerial Characteristics in Business Services Firms
Results are based on a single chain run of iterations 15,001-23,000
Posterior Posterior quantiles
Mean 2.5% 5% Median 95% 97.5%
Insolvency
Age of Manager
LogAge 8.579 4.434 4.700 8.387 12.570 12.950
(LogAge)2 -2.781 -4.536 -4.403 -2.794 -1.387 -1.296
Education: Nil Proportion
of Directors with Professional Qualications 0.109 -0.510 -0.408 0.109 0.616 0.727
Managers Tenure
Log(Chief Executives Years with Firm) -0.982 -2.296 -2.055 -1.050 0.398 1.066
Previous Unemployment -0.018 -0.629 -0.539 -0.017 0.478 0.585
Future Growth Objectivesa
grow moderately -0.435 -1.299 -1.156 -0.417 0.261 0.381
grow substantially -0.931 -2.022 -1.847 -0.900 -0.089 0.018
Managers Ownership: Share of Equity
held by Chief Executiveb
11-50 per cent 0.130 -0.836 -0.667 0.097 1.032 1.202
51 per cent and greater 0.507 -0.495 -0.372 0.484 1.434 1.602
Use of Government Business Advice -0.263 -0.886 -0.782 -0.256 0.244 0.330
Acquisition
Age of Manager
LogAge -3.508 -6.090 -5.714 -3.323 -1.368 -1.153
(LogAge)2 1.262 0.196 0.321 1.325 1.914 2.000
Education: Nil Proportion
of Directors with Professional Qualications -0.112 -0.834 -0.682 -0.120 0.467 0.570
Managers Tenure
Log(Chief Executives Years with Firm) -0.655 -1.885 -1.668 -0.644 0.291 0.448
Previous Unemployment -0.349 -1.058 -0.943 -0.340 0.223 0.309
Future Growth Objectivesa
grow moderately 2.936 0.583 0.794 2.876 5.312 6.107
grow substantially 3.707 1.230 1.430 3.663 6.087 6.830
Managers Ownership: Share of Equity
held by Chief Executiveb
11-50 per cent -1.422 -2.435 -2.266 -1.411 -0.679 -0.566
51 per cent and greater -1.212 -2.361 -2.103 -1.170 -0.410 -0.299
Use of Government Business Advice 0.162 -0.463 -0.365 0.157 0.672 0.766
a Reference Group: become smaller or stay same size.
b Reference Group: 10 per cent and less.
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Table 8A: E¤ects of Firm-level Attributes in Manufacturing Firms
Results are based on a single chain run of iterations 15,001-23,000
Posterior Posterior quantiles
Mean 2.5% 5% Median 95% 97.5%
Insolvency
Innovation -0.060 -0.864 -0.696 -0.072 0.627 0.779
Workforce Training 0.157 -0.453 -0.343 0.165 0.674 0.745
Non-Exporter 0.654 0.028 0.120 0.634 1.219 1.338
Actual Growth in Turnover (Sales) -1.017 -2.394 -2.207 -1.049 0.063 0.148
Protability:
Prot Margin before Interest,
DirectorsEmoluments and Taxc
Quintile 2 -1.143 -2.159 -1.982 -1.131 -0.372 -0.236
Quintile 3 -1.438 -2.619 -2.448 -1.396 -0.565 -0.417
Quintile 4 -0.904 -2.098 -1.894 -0.907 0.044 0.178
Quintile 5 (largest) -2.082 -3.474 -3.259 -2.048 -0.992 -0.801
Attempts to Raise External Finance 0.920 0.320 0.400 0.911 1.516 1.597
Employment Sized
10-24 employees -1.030 -1.986 -1.854 -1.019 -0.239 -0.036
25-49 employees -0.039 -1.030 -0.867 -0.047 0.859 1.031
50+ -0.147 -1.194 -1.025 -0.169 0.811 1.073
New Start-up 0.329 -0.284 -0.193 0.315 0.882 0.972
Acquisition
Innovation 0.036 -0.585 -0.493 0.028 0.570 0.699
Workforce Training 0.847 0.191 0.286 0.837 1.415 1.508
Non-Exporter 0.123 -0.479 -0.394 0.109 0.671 0.776
Actual Growth in Turnover (Sales) -0.618 -1.612 -1.446 -0.535 -0.039 0.018
Protability:
Prot Margin before Interest,
DirectorsEmoluments and Taxc
Quintile 2 -0.093 -1.075 -0.916 -0.080 0.700 0.847
Quintile 3 -0.269 -1.317 -1.128 -0.244 0.596 0.740
Quintile 4 0.293 -0.644 -0.512 0.277 1.112 1.230
Quintile 5 (largest) -0.303 -1.371 -1.223 -0.300 0.580 0.739
Attempts to Raise External Finance 0.402 -0.086 -0.022 0.399 0.823 0.932
Employment Sized
10-24 employees -0.396 -1.695 -1.480 -0.451 0.960 1.640
25-49 employees 0.375 -0.900 -0.745 0.290 1.717 2.342
50+ 0.775 -0.441 -0.265 0.691 2.070 2.700
New Start-up -0.177 -0.641 -0.573 -0.183 0.248 0.340
c Reference Group: quintile 1 (smallest).
d Reference Group: 2-9 employees.
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Table 8B: E¤ects of Firm-level Attributes in Business Services Firms
Results are based on a single chain run of iterations 15,001-23,000
Posterior Posterior quantiles
Mean 2.5% 5% Median 95% 97.5%
Insolvency
Innovation -0.697 -1.327 -1.245 -0.701 -0.141 -0.037
Workforce Training -0.134 -0.717 -0.610 -0.141 0.366 0.465
Non-Exporter -0.443 -1.143 -1.030 -0.438 0.168 0.249
Actual Growth in Turnover (Sales) -0.293 -0.990 -0.844 -0.249 0.101 0.165
Protability:
Prot Margin before Interest,
DirectorsEmoluments and Taxc
Quintile 2 -1.601 -2.728 -2.527 -1.578 -0.734 -0.577
Quintile 3 -1.939 -3.339 -3.103 -1.925 -0.873 -0.692
Quintile 4 -0.889 -1.854 -1.692 -0.892 -0.145 -0.010
Quintile 5 (largest) -2.567 -4.702 -4.246 -2.468 -1.264 -0.978
Attempts to Raise External Finance 0.477 -0.237 -0.111 0.480 1.068 1.199
Employment Sized
10-24 employees 0.595 -0.234 -0.098 0.588 1.293 1.440
25-49 employees 1.109 0.083 0.249 1.081 1.987 2.094
50+ 1.176 0.268 0.409 1.176 1.955 2.104
New Start-up 0.248 -0.377 -0.300 0.234 0.805 0.925
Acquisition
Innovation -1.372 -2.275 -2.157 -1.351 -0.639 -0.538
Workforce Training 0.257 -0.472 -0.335 0.276 0.767 0.899
Non-Exporter -0.772 -1.549 -1.428 -0.793 -0.070 0.044
Actual Growth in Turnover (Sales) 0.349 -0.096 -0.019 0.348 0.676 0.740
Protability:
Prot Margin before Interest,
DirectorsEmoluments and Taxc
Quintile 2 -1.527 -3.043 -2.740 -1.488 -0.437 -0.264
Quintile 3 -0.387 -1.486 -1.305 -0.371 0.512 0.667
Quintile 4 -0.308 -1.415 -1.201 -0.319 0.624 0.785
Quintile 5 (largest) -0.072 -1.221 -1.030 -0.063 0.848 1.029
Attempts to Raise External Finance 0.688 0.038 0.139 0.679 1.276 1.371
Employment Sized
10-24 employees -0.885 -2.260 -2.001 -0.856 0.131 0.287
25-49 employees 1.176 0.050 0.222 1.152 2.204 2.386
50+ 1.059 -0.037 0.105 1.032 1.970 2.133
New Start-up -0.153 -0.764 -0.672 -0.156 0.354 0.471
c Reference Group: quintile 1 (smallest).
d Reference Group: 2-9 employees.
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Table 9A: E¤ects of Environment on Manufacturing Firms
Results are based on a single chain run of iterations 15,001-23,000
Posterior Posterior quantiles
Mean 2.5% 5% Median 95% 97.5%
Insolvency
Market Structure:
Seller Concentration
Number of Serious Competitorse
3-5 1.588 0.509 0.650 1.596 2.550 2.726
6-10 0.691 -0.464 -0.314 0.685 1.690 1.926
more than 10 0.729 -0.785 -0.578 0.744 1.974 2.168
Customer Dependence:
Proportion of Sales to Largest Customerf
10-24 per cent -0.603 -1.407 -1.295 -0.589 0.059 0.183
25-49 per cent -0.457 -1.367 -1.221 -0.444 0.245 0.352
50 per cent or more 0.374 -0.766 -0.610 0.384 1.266 1.436
Locationg
Outer Southern England -0.230 -1.060 -0.957 -0.212 0.397 0.529
Industrial Heartland -0.552 -1.289 -1.160 -0.549 0.043 0.167
Periphery (North, Wales, Scotland) -0.105 -0.962 -0.828 -0.078 0.555 0.682
Acquisition
Market Structure:
Seller Concentration
Number of Serious Competitorse
3-5 0.274 -0.594 -0.493 0.264 1.063 1.195
6-10 -0.142 -1.024 -0.919 -0.144 0.689 0.875
more than 10 0.545 -0.483 -0.330 0.554 1.425 1.563
Customer Dependence:
Proportion of Sales to Largest Customerf
10-24 per cent -0.144 -0.773 -0.684 -0.152 0.414 0.528
25-49 per cent 0.130 -0.574 -0.468 0.132 0.722 0.854
50 per cent or more 0.319 -0.908 -0.689 0.340 1.262 1.416
Locationg
Outer Southern England -0.093 -0.743 -0.629 -0.092 0.426 0.490
Industrial Heartland -0.297 -0.866 -0.764 -0.290 0.144 0.252
Periphery (North, Wales, Scotland) -0.282 -1.140 -0.957 -0.261 0.374 0.470
e Reference Group: 0-2 serious competitors.
f Reference Group: less than 10 per cent.
g Reference Group: South East England.
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Table 9B: E¤ects of Environment on Business Services Firms
Results are based on a single chain run of iterations 15,001-23,000
Posterior Posterior quantiles
Mean 2.5% 5% Median 95% 97.5%
Insolvency
Market Structure:
Seller Concentration
Number of Serious Competitorse
3-5 -0.756 -1.644 -1.496 -0.766 -0.041 0.108
6-10 -1.032 -2.085 -1.933 -1.024 -0.150 -0.009
more than 10 -0.271 -1.131 -0.979 -0.260 0.417 0.573
Customer Dependence:
Proportion of Sales to Largest Customerf
10-24 per cent 1.028 -0.030 0.138 1.034 1.947 2.136
25-49 per cent 1.151 -0.024 0.163 1.141 2.171 2.385
50 per cent or more 0.719 -0.635 -0.410 0.732 1.739 1.920
Locationg
Outer Southern England 0.226 -0.622 -0.492 0.225 0.952 1.059
Industrial Heartland 0.516 -0.115 -0.032 0.523 1.056 1.163
Periphery (North, Wales, Scotland) -0.115 -1.262 -1.036 -0.095 0.728 0.909
Acquisition
Market Structure:
Seller Concentration
Number of Serious Competitorse
3-5 0.319 -0.815 -0.639 0.250 1.483 1.777
6-10 -0.446 -1.702 -1.485 -0.475 0.720 1.012
more than 10 -0.588 -1.984 -1.797 -0.626 0.661 0.930
Customer Dependence:
Proportion of Sales to Largest Customerf
10-24 per cent 0.320 -0.518 -0.381 0.300 1.080 1.262
25-49 per cent -0.225 -1.357 -1.185 -0.200 0.661 0.849
50 per cent or more -1.477 -3.461 -3.015 -1.382 -0.129 0.107
Locationg
Outer Southern England -0.947 -2.045 -1.817 -0.942 -0.114 0.006
Industrial Heartland 0.161 -0.605 -0.474 0.155 0.798 0.904
Periphery (North, Wales, Scotland) 0.324 -0.679 -0.527 0.339 1.162 1.300
e Reference Group: 0-2 serious competitors.
f Reference Group: less than 10 per cent.
g Reference Group: South East England.
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Table 10A: Additional Parameters for Manufacturing Firms
Results are based on a single chain run of iterations 15,001-23,000
Posterior Posterior quantiles
Mean 2.5% 5% Median 95% 97.5%
Insolvency
Age of Firm at Entry to Studyh
Age 26-50 0.113 -0.991 -0.796 0.101 1.018 1.249
Age 11-25 0.948 0.060 0.185 0.947 1.775 1.968
Age 6-10 0.688 -0.339 -0.176 0.690 1.634 1.866
Age  5 1.284 -0.076 0.153 1.277 2.481 2.696
Interval-specic xed e¤ectsi
1995-1996 -3.584 -4.852 -4.625 -3.558 -2.704 -2.580
1997-2000 -5.861 -7.416 -7.178 -5.830 -4.637 -4.448
Competing risk xed e¤ect -7.129 -13.310 -11.710 -7.448 -3.056 -2.162
Shape Parameter 6.077 4.432 4.658 6.012 7.845 8.097
Acquisition
Age of Firm at Entry to Studyh
Age 26-50 -0.118 -0.955 -0.831 -0.119 0.625 0.757
Age 11-25 0.754 0.070 0.192 0.746 1.337 1.458
Age 6-10 0.893 0.134 0.239 0.891 1.560 1.724
Age  5 0.796 -0.314 -0.140 0.790 1.754 1.921
Interval-specic xed e¤ectsi
1995-1996 -3.851 -4.816 -4.652 -3.854 -3.059 -2.928
1997-2000 -6.971 -8.665 -8.461 -7.010 -5.370 -5.144
Competing risk xed e¤ect -16.790 -19.000 -18.740 -16.970 -14.400 -13.140
Shape Parameter 8.877 6.746 6.919 9.017 10.570 10.770
h Reference Group: 51+.
i Reference Time Interval: 1991-1994.
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Table 10B: Additional Parameters for Business Services Firms
Results are based on a single chain run of iterations 15,001-23,000
Posterior Posterior quantiles
Mean 2.5% 5% Median 95% 97.5%
Insolvency
Age of Firm at Entry to Studyh
Age 26-50 0.127 -1.726 -1.428 0.077 1.856 2.087
Age 11-25 -0.348 -2.047 -1.847 -0.375 1.305 1.531
Age 6-10 -0.210 -1.967 -1.760 -0.160 1.349 1.685
Age  5 -0.234 -2.188 -1.963 -0.205 1.454 1.705
Interval-specic xed e¤ectsi
1995-1996 -3.708 -4.778 -4.636 -3.732 -2.651 -2.373
1997-2000 -7.113 -9.025 -8.805 -7.248 -4.817 -4.470
Competing risk xed e¤ect -18.170 -23.670 -22.880 -19.060 -9.870 -8.982
Shape Parameter 7.074 3.791 4.195 7.276 9.112 9.411
Acquisition
Age of Firm at Entry to Studyh
Age 26-50 2.289 -0.158 0.126 2.205 4.581 5.166
Age 11-25 2.288 0.294 0.554 2.180 4.248 5.021
Age 6-10 2.069 0.058 0.318 2.004 3.963 4.457
Age  5 1.881 -0.130 0.109 1.801 3.867 4.401
Interval-specic xed e¤ectsi
1995-1996 -2.847 -4.316 -4.084 -2.790 -1.851 -1.719
1997-2000 -7.333 -10.350 -9.902 -7.191 -5.479 -5.273
Competing risk xed e¤ect -19.990 -24.150 -23.660 -20.350 -15.290 -14.970
Shape Parameter 10.330 7.946 8.236 10.130 13.460 13.890
h Reference Group: 51+.
i Reference Time Interval: 1991-1994.
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